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This Comment examines the joint venture exception in the international silver
platter doctrine in the context of the use of wiretaps in federal narcotics cases. Under
the international silver platter doctrine, evidence obtained through searches (like
wiretaps) by foreign law enforcement on foreign soil and under foreign law is admissible in U.S. courts. The joint venture exception qualifies the international silver
platter doctrine: if participation by U.S. law enforcement in a wiretap by foreign law
enforcement on foreign soil constitutes a joint venture, then evidence obtained from
the search is admissible only if the wiretap was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Federal appellate courts lack uniform guidance on which factors to
evaluate and weigh in considering whether a joint venture between U.S. and foreign
law enforcement existed. This leads to rare findings of joint ventures. If courts do
not find that a joint venture existed, courts admit evidence obtained from joint ventures regardless of whether the wiretap complied with foreign law, which provides
defendants with no constitutional protections. Based on an empirical and qualitative analysis, this Comment proposes adopting a uniform balancing test for the joint
venture exception that considers: (1) who controlled the wiretap, (2) whether U.S.
law enforcement provided substantial resources to foreign law enforcement, and
(3) how U.S. and foreign law enforcement describe their relationship. This proposal
would lead to increased findings of joint ventures in cases involving cooperation in
conducting wiretaps between U.S. and foreign law enforcement abroad. Specifically,
the proposal would require that more wiretaps comply with the law of the country
where they were intercepted. Because courts would find joint ventures more often
with my proposed balancing test, my proposal could also increase judicial legitimacy, since courts would less often be deciding cases based on illegally obtained
evidence from abroad.

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 1872
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL BASES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SILVER
PLATTER DOCTRINE .................................................................................... 1879
A. The Fourth Amendment and Searches on Foreign Soil .................. 1879
B. Introduction to the International Silver Platter Doctrine .............. 1884

† B.A. 2018, Cornell University; J.D. Candidate 2023, The University of Chicago
Law School. I would like to thank Professor Eric Posner and the editors and staff of the
University of Chicago Law Review for their thoughtful advice and insight on this
Comment.

1871

1872

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:7

1. Historical background. ............................................................... 1884
2. Modern-day elements of the doctrine........................................ 1885
II. THE JOINT VENTURE EXCEPTION IN NARCOTICS CASES.............................. 1887
A. Rules and Factors for Establishing a Joint Venture ....................... 1887
1.
Substantial participation. .......................................................... 1892
2.
Virtual agent. ............................................................................. 1895
3.
Intent to evade the Constitution. .............................................. 1897
B. Analysis of Foreign Law ................................................................... 1899
C. The Good Faith Exception ................................................................ 1901
III. CREATING A UNIFORM BALANCING TEST TO ESTABLISH A JOINT VENTURE 1902
A. Initiation or Control of the Wiretap ................................................. 1904
1. Requesting, initiating, supervising, and intercepting the wiretap
and active participation in the wiretap. ................................... 1905
2. Receiving intercepted communications from the wiretap........ 1907
3. Initiation of the investigation. ................................................... 1908
B. Provision of Substantial Resources .................................................. 1908
1. Translation. ................................................................................ 1909
2. Cooperation agreements. ........................................................... 1909
C. Describing the Relationship ............................................................. 1913
D. Factors that Should Not Be Considered .......................................... 1914
E. Applying the Balancing Test ............................................................ 1914
1. United States v. Lee: Evidence of a cooperation agreement
constitutes a prima facie case of a joint venture. ..................... 1914
2. United States v. Maturo: Shifting judicial focus to viewing the
evidence in a light favorable to finding a joint venture. .......... 1916
3. This proposal increases the likelihood of finding a joint venture,
which provides some—but not complete—constitutional
protections. ................................................................................. 1918
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 1922

INTRODUCTION
Narcotics manufacturing and trafficking pose significant
threats to U.S. law enforcement and national security.1 Drug trafficking occurs through highly complex networks of individuals
and groups that manufacture and transport drugs across borders.
These groups, organized as drug cartels or drug-trafficking
1
See Christopher M. Pilkerton, The Bite of the Apple: The Use of Narcotics-Related
Foreign Wiretap Evidence in New York City Courts, 11 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 103, 103 (1999)
(“The global trade of drug trafficking currently poses the most serious threat that U.S. law
enforcement has ever had to combat.”); Brian Mann, U.S.-Mexico Efforts Targeting Drug
Cartels Have Unraveled, Top DEA Official Says, NPR (May 3, 2021),
https://perma.cc/ZJA5-UWDV; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., HOMELAND THREAT
ASSESSMENT 21 (2020).
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organizations (DTOs),2 produce and manufacture drugs in the
United States and abroad.3 They then coordinate and carry out
the transportation and sale of drugs across borders.4
This process creates substantial violence, crime, and death in
the United States and foreign countries, including murder, assault, theft, corruption, human trafficking, and money laundering.5 The Department of Homeland Security specifically identifies
Mexican cartels as posing the greatest threat to the United
States,6 although cartels in other parts of the world also pose
threats.7 Mexican cartels pose a large threat “because of their
ability to control territory—including along the U.S. Southwest
border—and co-opt parts of [the Mexican] government.”8 The fracturing of Mexican DTOs creates fights over territory, which “almost certainly will lead to increased violence in Mexico[ ] along
the U.S. Southwest border.”9 U.S.-based gangs help cartels distribute drugs domestically, and those gangs compete with each
other for clientele, contributing to domestic, drug-related violence.10 Narcotics trafficking also increases narcotics use, contributing to a public health crisis of drug overdoses.11 Further, cartel

2
The media uses “drug cartels” and “DTOs” interchangeably. Cartels can comprise
a single DTO, or many DTOs can make up one cartel. See Nat’l Drug Intel. Ctr., Drug
Trafficking Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 2010), https://perma.cc/UX2N-3Q5Q
(stating that cartels function with “the assistance of DTOs that are either a part of or in
an alliance with the cartel”).
3
See Pilkerton, supra note 1, at 105.
4
See id. This Comment focuses on drug trafficking into the United States, over
which U.S. federal courts have jurisdiction.
5
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., 2020 DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 69, 72, 81 (2021) (discussing murder, theft, corruption, and money laundering); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra
note 1, at 22 (discussing assault, human trafficking, and money laundering for transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)).
6
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 1, at 21.
7
See id. at 21 (describing Mexican TCOs); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN.,
supra note 5, at 33, 35, 75 (describing Central American, South American, and Asian
DTOs); Cocaine and Guinea-Bissau: How Africa’s ‘Narco-state’ Is Trying to Kick its Habit,
BBC NEWS (May 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/4QQL-DMYP.
8
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 1, at 21.
9
Id.
10 See id.; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., supra note 5, at 81 (noting that
over 60% of Puerto Rico’s homicides are drug related).
11 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., supra note 5, at 31 (noting that
deaths from drug poisoning involving cocaine increased by about 251% in the United
States between 2010 and 2018).
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violence and power have increased during the COVID-19 pandemic.12
In response to these threats, the United States has devoted
substantial resources to identifying DTOs and prosecuting their
members.13 The transnational structure of drug trafficking facilitates the admissibility of key evidence in narcotics cases.14 Understanding how narcotics prosecutions work is important because of
their prevalence in federal courts and the impact that both drug
trafficking and drug-trafficking prosecutions can have on public
safety. The easier it is to prosecute narcotics traffickers, the
greater the likelihood that these traffickers will be found guilty,
which decreases the risk that they will continue to pose to public
safety.
The transnational scope of drug trafficking requires the operation of cross-border communication networks to coordinate
drug transportation,15 which gives rise to two features of narcotics
prosecutions that impact the admissibility of evidence in trials.
First, narcotics investigations require a coordinated, international response—domestic prosecutions can rely (sometimes exclusively) on evidence obtained by foreign police officers abroad or
evidence that U.S. and foreign law enforcement have worked together abroad to obtain.16
12 See JUNE S. BEITTEL & LIANA W. ROSEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IN11535, MEXICAN
DRUG TRAFFICKING AND CARTEL OPERATIONS AMID COVID-19, at 2 (2021) (describing how
cartels seemingly exploited the pandemic by increasing prices on drugs, distributing aid
packages with cartel logos, and enforcing stay-at-home lockdowns and also noting that
Mexico’s two biggest cartels, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel,
“show signs of expansion in Mexico and have increased their role in production and pill
pressing” (quotation marks omitted)).
13 See Fact Sheet: The Biden Administration Launches New Efforts to Counter Transnational Criminal Organizations and Illicit Drugs, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 15, 2021) [hereinafter White House], https://perma.cc/SVA9-PT28.
14 See id.
15 See Pilkerton, supra note 1, at 105 (explaining how federal wiretaps may capture
communications between international parties); Wiretap Report 2020, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31,
2020), https://perma.cc/MQ8K-PA5K (“Drug offenses were the most prevalent type of criminal offenses investigated using reported wiretaps.”).
16 See Eric Bentley, Jr., Toward an International Fourth Amendment: Rethinking
Searches and Seizures Abroad After Verdugo-Urquidez, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 329,
369–70 (1994). The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) stations U.S. agents in countries that pose a narcotics threat to the United States to work with local police. See North
and Central America, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN. (2021), https://perma.cc/FM9Z-VXXC. To
facilitate intelligence sharing and other forms of cooperation between U.S. police and their
foreign counterparts, the United States enters into cooperation agreements with certain
foreign countries. See, e.g., Michael C. Kenney, Intelligence Games: Comparing the Intelligence Capabilities of Law Enforcement Agencies and Drug Trafficking Enterprises, 16
INT’L J. INTEL. & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 212, 214 (2010). This Comment further discusses
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Second, because cartels rely on communication networks,
cartel investigations often involve foreign law enforcement on foreign soil placing wiretaps on particular phone numbers, and these
wiretaps are governed by foreign law. U.S. prosecutors can use
communications intercepted via such wiretaps as evidence of cartel activity. U.S. federal courts determine the admissibility of
communications intercepted via these foreign wiretaps under the
“international silver platter doctrine.”17 In this Comment, a
search under the international silver platter doctrine means a
wiretap by foreign law enforcement on a phone belonging to a U.S.
or non―U.S. citizen while that person is located outside of the
United States.
Under the international silver platter doctrine, U.S. courts
automatically admit this wiretap evidence unless one of two exceptions apply. First, if foreign officials’ conduct in obtaining the
wiretap “shocks the judicial conscience” of the U.S. court, the
court excludes the evidence.18 This exception is further described
in Part I.B.1. This Comment primarily focuses on the second exception: the “joint venture” exception.19
The joint venture exception requires courts to engage in a
two-step analysis to determine admissibility.20 First, courts must
determine if participation by U.S. law enforcement in a search by
foreign law enforcement on foreign soil constituted a joint venture.21 Second, if a joint venture existed, courts evaluate whether
the wiretap was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.22 The
Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and
seizures.”23 As a form of digital surveillance, wiretaps constitute

these agreements and their implications for the international silver platter doctrine in
Parts II.A.2 and III.B.
17 The phrase “silver platter” comes from Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949):
“[I]t is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned
over to the federal authorities on a silver platter.” Id. at 78–79.
18 See United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 2009); Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952).
19 Most circuits refer to this exception as the joint venture exception. While the
Second Circuit has rejected the exception by name, it refers to the exception’s principles
by the two rules it applies: virtual agent and intent to evade the Constitution. I discuss
these rules in detail in Part II.A.2–3. See United States v. Getto, 729 F.3d 221, 233 (2d
Cir. 2013); United States v. Lee, 723 F.3d 134, 140 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013). For simplicity, I will
refer to this exception as the joint venture exception.
20 See United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1995).
21 See, e.g., id.
22 See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 494 (1987).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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searches under U.S. law.24 When used by U.S. officials domestically, wiretaps implicate the Fourth Amendment, which requires
police officers to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause
from a magistrate judge prior to initiating a wiretap unless a delineated exception to the warrant or probable cause requirements
applies.25 The protections of the warrant and probable cause requirements do not apply to searches conducted abroad as part of
a joint venture, and instead courts look to foreign law to determine whether a wiretap was reasonable for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment.
This Comment addresses a key issue in the first step of applying the joint venture exception that poses constitutional, privacy, and liberty concerns: circuits lack a uniform test for
determining what constitutes a joint venture.26 Accordingly,
venue becomes a crucial factor in whether a court will find that a
joint venture existed. The lack of a uniform test also allows courts
to undervalue certain forms of cooperation.27
In practice, the lack of a uniform test leads to few findings of
a joint venture in the wiretap context, which poses concerns for
U.S. defendants’ constitutional rights and their privacy and liberty interests. If courts do not classify U.S.-foreign cooperation as
a joint venture, any wiretap interceptions are admissible in U.S.
federal courts regardless of whether they complied with foreign
or domestic law. An illegally obtained wiretap can thus be used
as key evidence in prosecutions against defendants even if U.S.
law enforcement did not rely in good faith on representations
from foreign police that they complied with foreign law in obtaining the wiretap. There is no parallel to this with domestic wiretaps, where evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is only admissible if the good faith exception applies.
Narcotics prosecutions pose a challenging balancing act for
the United States. When prosecuting drug-trafficking crimes,
U.S. courts are faced with a dilemma in choosing between admitting evidence obtained from foreign wiretaps—which often
24

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–53 (1967).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52. Wiretaps also implicate Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516–
2518, which is not discussed in this Comment because it governs only domestic wiretaps.
See Pilkerton, supra note 1, at 113.
26 See infra Part II.A.
27 See, e.g., Caitlin T. Street, Note, Streaming the International Silver Platter Doctrine: Coordinating Transnational Law Enforcement in the Age of Global Terrorism and
Technology, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 411, 434–35 (2011).
25
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provide information crucial to conviction and ultimately increase
public safety—and providing constitutional protections for defendants. The United States values international cooperation in
combating the international threat posed by narcotics trafficking.28 This international cooperation, combined with the current
application of the joint venture exception, eases the admissibility
of evidence obtained abroad in U.S. courts because the Fourth
Amendment analysis under the joint venture exception only requires evaluating foreign law. Foreign law generally falls short of
the probable cause and warrant requirements of domestic
searches.29 Accordingly, international cooperation and the joint
venture exception often strengthen the prosecution’s case against
drug traffickers. Easier prosecutions of drug traffickers protect
the U.S. public against harms associated with drug trafficking.
Constitutional protections sit on the other side of the balancing scale. International cooperation may increase public safety,
but it does so at a constitutional cost. For example, the lack of a
clear joint venture test decreases the likelihood that courts will
find that a joint venture existed. When courts do not find that a
joint venture existed, courts admit evidence from wiretaps conducted by foreign law enforcement abroad that did not comply
with the law of the country where they were conducted, enabling
prosecutors to use illegally obtained evidence to convict defendants. This has the effect of providing U.S. citizens with reduced
constitutional protection when they leave U.S. borders. This is
problematic because it allows prosecutors to use illegally obtained
evidence to convict defendants. Further, the use of illegally obtained evidence also harms judicial legitimacy. Courts provide
constitutional protections to U.S. citizens, and failing to carry out
this function erodes public trust in the judiciary. Allowing this
evidence into U.S. federal courts to be used against U.S. defendants subsequently can harm judicial institutional legitimacy.
This Comment proposes a novel, uniform balancing test for
determining what constitutes a joint venture. It uses an empirical
and quantitative analysis to address the constitutional and institutional legitimacy concerns without sacrificing international cooperation and public safety. I conducted a comprehensive
empirical study of narcotics cases in circuit courts and the District
Court for the District of Columbia (D.D.C.) that involved wiretaps
28
29

ing).

See, e.g., Mission, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN. (2022), https://perma.cc/27FB-HSR5.
See Street, supra note 27, at 433; Barona, 56 F.3d at 1099 (Reinhardt, J., dissent-
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and the international silver platter doctrine. For each case, I categorized the rules and factors used to determine whether a joint
venture existed. Table 1 reflects the results of this analysis and
provides a guide to the factors that courts rely on most frequently
in their joint venture determinations.
Based on the results in Table 1 and the policy justifications
discussed in Part III, this Comment proposes a balancing test involving the following factors: (1) who controlled the wiretap,
(2) whether U.S. law enforcement provided substantial resources
to foreign law enforcement, and (3) how U.S. and foreign law enforcement describe their relationship. This would lead to increased findings of joint ventures in cases involving cooperation
between U.S. and foreign law enforcement in conducting wiretaps
abroad.
Finding a joint venture only triggers the most basic constitutional protections for criminal defendants: it requires that wiretaps comply with the law of the country where they were
intercepted. This minor increase in constitutional protections for
defendants is significant, even if it does not guarantee the domestic protections of a warrant and probable cause, because the current practice—which very rarely finds joint ventures—provides
defendants with no constitutional protections at all. Because
courts would find joint ventures more often with my proposed balancing test and would therefore decide fewer cases based on evidence illegally obtained abroad, my proposal would also increase
judicial legitimacy.
Part I of this Comment offers background on the international silver platter doctrine and describes the elements of the
doctrine. Part II analyzes the mechanics of the joint venture exception: whether a joint venture existed, the application of foreign
law, and the good faith exception. Lastly, Part III describes a solution to a key issue posed by the joint venture exception by proposing a balancing test for what constitutes a joint venture.30
Wiretaps pose the most challenging case study for the joint
venture exception—as demonstrated by how rarely courts find
joint ventures in wiretap cases—because they involve remote

30 The most recent scholarship on this comes from former law student Caitlin T.
Street. Street described the rules that circuit courts use to evaluate whether a joint venture existed, employed a qualitative analysis to revise the joint venture rules, and provided alternatives to excluding evidence from joint ventures. See Street, supra note 27, at
448–54. This Comment takes a different approach by focusing on the factors evaluated
within the rules rather than on expanding the rules’ scope.
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cooperation. My proposal can extend beyond the wiretap context
to all searches conducted abroad and would have a similar effect
of increasing the likelihood of finding a joint venture in these
cases.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL BASES FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the United
States has helped foreign countries control the international flow
of illicit drugs.31 The United States provides assistance, in the
form of money and cooperation agreements, to “source” and
“transit” countries32 with high incidences of narcotics trafficking.33 This sets the background of global cooperation against
which the international silver platter doctrine operates. As
Parts II.A and III discuss, such global cooperation also makes it
difficult to define what constitutes a joint venture.
This Part introduces the international silver platter doctrine.
Part I.A situates the international silver platter doctrine within
the constitutional framework of Fourth Amendment protections.
Part I.B then discusses the doctrine’s history and its development
from domestic to international in scope. Although the international silver platter doctrine now covers a global sphere, its domestic constitutional law origins still affect how it operates today.
A. The Fourth Amendment and Searches on Foreign Soil
In prosecuting narcotics trafficking violations, government
agencies often obtain intelligence from electronic sources. This
can include communications—such as phone calls, text

31 See LIANA W. ROSEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34543, INTERNATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL POLICY: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RESPONSES 12 (2015).
32 Kenney, supra note 16, at 214.
33 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENF’T AFFS.,
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, VOLUME I: DRUG AND CHEMICAL
CONTROL 27–36 (2021) (describing the forms of assistance that federal agencies provide to
international partners in combatting drug trafficking).
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messages,34 and emails—intercepted through wiretapping devices.35 To place a wiretap on a landline, police insert a wire on
the cords associated with the landline to intercept conversations
to and from the landline’s phone number.36 Intercepting calls from
public phones requires that police insert listening devices on public phone booths.37 Law enforcement can also intercept calls on
cell phones by contacting the carrier to intercept calls to and from
a particular phone number.38 Wiretaps provide a unique window
into cartels that would otherwise be obtainable only through confidential informants because cartel operations often occur in private.39
As a form of surveillance, wiretaps constitute searches under
U.S. law.40 When used by U.S. officials domestically, wiretaps implicate the Fourth Amendment, which protects individuals
against “unreasonable searches and seizures” by the U.S. government.41 Domestic searches conducted by U.S. officials are reasonable if those officials first obtain a warrant based on probable
cause from a magistrate judge, unless a delineated exception to
the warrant or probable cause requirements applies.42
If law enforcement officers violate the Fourth Amendment by
conducting a search without a warrant supported by probable
cause, courts can exclude evidence obtained from such a search

34 Cartel members often communicate over WhatsApp because its encryption software provides them with more protection from government surveillance than standard
text messages. Because of WhatsApp’s encryption software, the federal government must
receive WhatsApp’s permission to intercept these communications. See, e.g., Thomas
Brewster, Forget About Backdoors, This Is the Data WhatsApp Actually Hands to Cops,
FORBES (Jan. 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/P48X-YMZV; Natasha Clancy, Gang in Mexico
Offers “Drug Menu” Via Encrypted WhatsApp, INSIGHT CRIME (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://perma.cc/UFP5-2SQE.
35 See Kenney, supra note 16, at 222; U.S. Dep’t of Just., 29. Electronic Surveillance
– Title III Affidavits, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ARCHIVES (Jan. 16, 2020),
https://perma.cc/MT4B-7S3U (discussing the requirements for a federal wiretap application).
36 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57 (1928), overruled by Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967).
37 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
38 See Deedee Sun, How Federal Agents Can Tap Your Phones, KWCH (Feb. 14,
2017), https://perma.cc/FC2H-MHSM.
39 See Kenney, supra note 16, at 229.
40 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52.
41 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52.
42 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. These exceptions—exigent circumstances, plain view,
automobiles, consent, and searches incident to arrest—are outside the scope of this
Comment.
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under the exclusionary rule.43 With exceptions, “[t]he exclusionary rule prevents the government from using most evidence gathered in violation of the United States Constitution.”44 A key aim
of the exclusionary rule is encouraging U.S. law enforcement to
conduct lawful searches.45 The Supreme Court has explained that,
when it comes to searches conducted by U.S. actors, illegally obtained evidence should be excluded to deter unlawful behavior by
providing an incentive for law enforcement agents to behave lawfully.46
The application of the Fourth Amendment is less straightforward when government actors operate outside of the United
States. The Supreme Court has noted that “[w]hen the
Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the
shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution
provide to protect [one’s] life and liberty should not be stripped
away just because [one] happens to be in another land.”47 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has found that the Fourth Amendment’s
protections apply to “American citizens at home and abroad.”48
But the Supreme Court has also held that routine searches at or
along the border when an individual is entering or suspected of
entering the United States do not require a warrant or probable
cause.49 Borders are unique because “[t]he Government’s interest
in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its
zenith at the international border.”50 Areas beyond the border in
foreign countries do not pose a similar threat, so there remains
ambiguity regarding the extent to which the Fourth Amendment
and other constitutional protections apply.

43 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). See also generally Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
44 Legal Info. Inst., Exclusionary Rule, CORNELL L. SCH. WEX (June 2017),
https://perma.cc/H2PM-WUBT.
45 See United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 491 (9th Cir. 1987) (describing “deterring federal officers from unlawful conduct” as the rationale for excluding evidence).
The exclusionary rule also aims to “provide remedies to defendants whose rights have been
infringed.” Id. This Comment is principally concerned with the deterrence rationale and
its relation to the joint venture exception.
46 Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
47 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957).
48 United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1234 (1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting)).
49 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004); United States
v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1983).
50 Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152.
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In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,51 the Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches of
the residences of non―U.S. citizens outside the United States by
U.S. law enforcement.52 The Court reasoned that the Framers of
the Constitution intended the Fourth Amendment to apply only
to domestic searches conducted by U.S. law enforcement.53 Similarly, lower courts have held that the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to searches conducted solely by foreign officials who enforce foreign law abroad even if the targets are U.S. citizens.54 The
Fourth Amendment does not apply in these circumstances because the conduct at issue involves nonU.S. law enforcement acting abroad.
Evidence gathered in searches conducted by foreign law enforcement agents in contravention of foreign law abroad is typically considered admissible in U.S. courts because exclusion of
that evidence would not deter illegal law enforcement action.55
Foreign law governs these situations, meaning that foreign law
enforcement officers do not have an obligation to follow Fourth
Amendment domestic warrant and probable cause requirements.
Foreign law enforcement officers are also less concerned than
their U.S. counterparts that key evidence can be excluded from
court since they do not have as large of a stake in U.S. prosecutions of narcotics traffickers as U.S. law enforcement officers do.

51

494 U.S. 259 (1990).
See id. at 274–75 (refusing to extend Fourth Amendment protection to a residence
located in Mexico belonging to a Mexican citizen with no voluntary attachment to the
United States); Bentley, supra note 16, at 333 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not reach
abroad to protect a foreign suspect who lacks a ‘substantial connection’ with the United
States.”).
53 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 266–67.
54 Peterson, 812 F.2d at 490 (citing United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th
Cir. 1978)); United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1230–31 (11th Cir. 1986), modified,
801 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1986).
55 See Rosenthal, 793 F.2d at 1230 (doubting the deterrent effect on foreign police
practices following from punitive exclusion of evidence in question by U.S. courts); United
States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted):
52

The principal purpose of the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of unlawful police conduct, the theory being that such deterrence tends to foster obedience to
the mandate of Fourth Amendment. In circumstances where application of the
rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, its use is not warranted . . . since
United States courts cannot be expected to police law enforcement practices
around the world, let alone to conform such practices to Fourth Amendment
standards by means of deterrence, the exclusionary rule does not normally apply
to foreign searches conducted by foreign officials.
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Additionally, U.S. police are not involved, so there is also no unlawful behavior by U.S. law enforcement to deter.
The Supreme Court has analyzed only situations involving
solely U.S. law enforcement actions abroad, whereas the international silver platter doctrine deals with combined U.S.-foreign
law enforcement efforts. Joint ventures represent a blending of
the abovementioned Fourth Amendment considerations of reasonableness and the exclusionary rule since they implicate domestic and international actors. Joint ventures involve foreign
law enforcement officials acting abroad under foreign law with
U.S. cooperation. If a joint venture between U.S. and foreign law
enforcement existed, courts will evaluate the reasonableness of
the wiretap under the Fourth Amendment in light of the foreign
law of the country in which the wiretap occurred. If foreign law
enforcement complied with foreign law in conducting the joint
venture wiretap with U.S. involvement, the search will be considered reasonable and courts will admit evidence from the search.
However, foreign law generally falls short of the probable cause
and warrant requirements of domestic searches.56 This means
that U.S. citizens do not receive the probable cause and warrant
protections of the Fourth Amendment in searches conducted
abroad by foreign law enforcement even if U.S. law enforcement
officers are involved in the investigation.57
The inability to deter foreign and U.S. officials in joint ventures by applying the exclusionary rule clarifies why courts look
to non-U.S. law to determine the reasonableness of joint venture
wiretaps.58 When a joint venture exists between U.S. and foreign
law enforcement, courts posit that requiring a warrant and probable cause would not deter federal officers from unlawful conduct.
In joint ventures, foreign and U.S. officers are not deterred from
unlawful conduct because if a joint venture wiretap complies with
foreign law, U.S. law enforcement are not engaged in illegal behavior under foreign law, and there is no unlawful behavior to
deter.59

56

See Street, supra note 27, at 433; Barona, 56 F.3d at 1099 (Reinhardt, J., dissent-

ing).
57 See Barona, 56 F.3d at 1099 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“Without the probable
cause requirement, the Fourth Amendment is without any real force.”).
58 See, e.g., Peterson, 812 F.2d at 491 (considering Philippine law in determining
whether a search was reasonable).
59 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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B. Introduction to the International Silver Platter Doctrine
The international silver platter doctrine emerged in U.S. jurisprudence around six decades ago.60 Part I.B.1 discusses the history and development of the doctrine, focusing on the state silver
platter doctrine. Part I.B.2 explains its modern-day elements—
namely, the “shocks the conscience” and joint venture exceptions.
1. Historical background.
The international silver platter doctrine emerged from the
application of the Fourth Amendment to state action before the
Fourteenth Amendment was incorporated against the states.
Prior to that incorporation, the Fourth Amendment did not cover
searches by local law enforcement.61 Under this legal context, the
state silver platter doctrine determined when the Fourth
Amendment applied to searches that were jointly conducted by
federal and local law enforcement under the test62 set forth by
Byars v. United States63 and Lustig v. United States.64 The ByarsLustig test aimed to prevent federal law enforcement officers from
circumventing the Constitution by joining local police searches to
obtain evidence without following the Fourth Amendment’s requirements that applied to federal searches.65 Although the test
has been rejected in the domestic context,66 the test and justifications underpinning this state-oriented doctrine still influence the
modern international silver platter doctrine.
The Byars-Lustig test established that federal-agent participation in a search with local police constitutes a joint venture between federal and local law enforcement if local law enforcement
acted as an agent of federal law enforcement.67 An agency relationship exists when “the effect is the same as though [a federal

60

See Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir. 1965).
See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
62 See Keith Raffel, Searches and Seizures Abroad in the Federal Courts, 38 MD. L.
REV. 689, 694 (1979).
63 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
64 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
65 See Byars, 273 U.S. at 32.
66 See generally Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (citing a desire to foster
cooperation “under constitutional standards” between federal and state law enforcement
officials as well as judicial integrity as reasons to eliminate the silver platter doctrine in
the federal-state context).
67 See Byars, 273 U.S. at 32 (“[T]he federal prohibition agent was not invited to join
the state squad as a private person might have been, but was asked to participate and did
participate as a federal enforcement officer.”).
61
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law enforcement officer] had engaged in the undertaking as one
exclusively his own.”68 This can occur if federal law enforcement
has an “actuality of a share . . . in the total enterprise of securing
and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means.”69 In
Byars, federal law enforcement had an actuality of a share in the
state search because they conducted the search with state law enforcement and seized items not authorized under the state search
warrant.70 Similarly, in Lustig, federal law enforcement had an
actuality of a share in the state search because they were physically present at the search.71 Thus, under the Byars-Lustig test,
determining whether an agency relationship existed was heavily
dependent on the physical presence of federal law enforcement at
state searches. The Supreme Court also described such involvement as federal law enforcement “ha[ving] a hand in [the
search].”72
2. Modern-day elements of the doctrine.
Currently, the international silver platter doctrine dictates
whether federal courts should admit evidence from searches of
U.S. or non―U.S. citizens conducted abroad by foreign law enforcement under foreign law. According to the doctrine, that evidence is admissible with two exceptions: the shocks the
conscience exception and the joint venture exception.
The shocks the conscience exception stems from “a federal
court’s inherent ‘supervisory powers over the administration of
federal justice’” 73 to “preserve the integrity of the criminal justice
system.”74 Applying the exception preserves the criminal justice
system’s integrity by excluding evidence if the conduct of the
foreign officials shocks the conscience of the U.S. court.75 The exception “is meant to protect against conduct that violates fundamental international norms of decency.”76 Lower courts generally
find that wiretaps do not shock the conscience. Wiretaps fall
68

Id. at 33.
Lustig, 338 U.S. at 79.
70 See Byars, 273 U.S. at 29–31.
71 See Lustig, 338 U.S. at 79–80.
72 Id. at 78.
73 United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Birdsell, 346 F.2d at 783 n.10).
74 Barona, 56 F.3d at 1091.
75 See Emmanuel, 565 F.3d at 1330–31; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73
(1952).
76 Emmanuel, 565 F.3d at 1331.
69
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outside of the Supreme Court’s responsibility to “exercise [ ]
judgement upon the whole course of the proceedings . . . in order
to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice.”77
The joint venture exception is more complicated than the
shocks the conscience exception and allows for the introduction of
evidence in a few circumstances. Analysis of the joint venture exception involves two steps. First, courts must make a threshold
determination of whether U.S. law enforcement’s involvement
with foreign law enforcement in the wiretap constituted a joint
venture.78 If a court does not find a joint venture, the evidence is
automatically admissible, regardless of the legality of the methods used to obtain it. Although the joint venture exception descended from the state silver platter doctrine, unlike Lustig, finding a joint venture in the modern context requires proof of more
involvement than just U.S. law enforcement having had a hand
in the search.79 Part II discusses the factors courts use to determine if a joint venture existed.
Second, if a joint venture existed, courts must evaluate
whether the wiretap was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.80 When courts evaluate reasonableness, however, they do
not look to U.S. law. Rather, courts consult the law of the country
where the wiretap occurred to determine if the search was reasonable.81 So long as the wiretap complied with foreign law, the
wiretap is considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
and courts admit the evidence.82 If the wiretap did not comply
with foreign law, U.S. federal courts exclude the evidence unless
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.83 Courts
apply the good faith exception when U.S. law enforcement

77

Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416–17

(1945)).
78 See Rosenthal, 793 F.2d at 1231; United States v. Maturo, 982 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.
1992); Barona, 56 F.3d at 1191; United States v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503, 510–11 (11th Cir.
1994); Street, supra note 27, at 433–34.
79 See Wayne A. Logan, Dirty Silver Platters: The Enduring Challenge of Intergovernmental Investigative Illegality, 99 IOWA L. REV. 293, 323 (2013).
80 See Street, supra note 27, at 434.
81 See Barona, 56 F.3d at 1093.
82 See id. at 1091 n.1 (noting that the law of the country where the search occurred
“governs whether the search was reasonable” (citing Peterson, 812 F.2d at 491)).
83 See Street, supra note 27, at 434.
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“reasonably relied on [ ] representations that the wiretaps were
legal under [foreign] law.”84
II. THE JOINT VENTURE EXCEPTION IN NARCOTICS CASES
The modern formulation of the joint venture exception stems
from the factors used in the Byars-Lustig test. There are three
rules that courts consider when determining whether a joint venture existed: substantial participation,85 virtual agent,86 and intent to evade the Constitution.87 Some circuits have adopted one
rule in particular, while others use a combination of two rules.
This Part discusses how courts currently evaluate the joint
venture exception to the international silver platter doctrine.
Part II.A evaluates the three rules that courts use to determine
whether a joint venture existed. Parts II.B and II.C discuss what
happens after a court finds that a joint venture existed: applying
foreign law to determine whether the wiretap was reasonable and
applying the good faith exception if the wiretap failed to comply
with foreign law. Although this Comment focuses on the threshold inquiry of whether a joint venture exists, analyzing foreign
law and the good faith exception is important because once defendants get past the threshold inquiry, these two analyses provide defendants with a higher level of protection than if the court
finds no joint venture: either the wiretap must have complied
with foreign law or U.S. officials must have thought that it did.
While these protections are far from domestic Fourth Amendment
requirements,88 they provide more protection than simply admitting illegally obtained evidence without conducting a reasonableness analysis.
A. Rules and Factors for Establishing a Joint Venture
Understanding what rules and factors courts use to evaluate
whether a joint venture existed is important for providing defendants with constitutional protections. If the rules—or the factors
which comprise them—are too challenging to satisfy, U.S. federal
courts automatically admit evidence from U.S.-foreign operations
84 United States v. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2007); see also, e.g., Peterson, 812 F.2d at 492.
85 See infra Part II.A.1.
86 See infra Part II.A.2.
87 See infra Part II.A.3.
88 See Street, supra note 27, at 433; United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1099 (9th
Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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abroad, regardless of the legality of the means used to obtain that
evidence. If the rules and factors lower the burden of finding a
joint venture, courts then start to provide defendants with some
constitutional protections under the Fourth Amendment. The
First, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and the D.D.C. use the
“substantial participation” and “virtual agent” rules.89 The Second
and Third Circuits use the virtual agent and “intent to evade the
Constitution” rules.90
Table 1 catalogs circuit court and D.D.C. cases on federal narcotics prosecutions involving wiretaps conducted by foreign law
enforcement authorities abroad. The horizontal axis lists the factors courts use to determine whether a joint venture existed. A
case receives a “1” for each factor if the court considered it in determining whether a joint venture existed. For each court, the
bolded numbers represent the total number of times the court
considered that factor. The table helps identify which factors
courts rely on most when making a joint venture determination,
which assists in forming a uniform balancing test.
The table shows that within each rule, courts balance different factors to determine if a joint venture existed, but some of the
rules evaluate similar factors. For example, the substantial participation and virtual agent rules tend to involve similar factors,
except in some of the Second and Third Circuits’ applications of
the virtual agent rule. This Comment will argue that none of the
circuits have struck the right balance of factors. To make that critique, however, it is important to first describe the balance that
they have struck.

89 See United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33, 52 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v.
Mitro, 880 F.2d 1480, 1482 (1st Cir. 1989); Barona, 56 F.3d at 1096 (finding that Italian
law enforcement telling U.S. officers about a wiretap did not constitute substantial participation); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (1987); United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th
Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 1986), modified, 801 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1986)); United States v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 573 (10th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503, 510–11 (11th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2007).
90 See United States v. Maturo, 982 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Getto,
729 F.3d 221, 228, 235 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Minaya, 827 F. App’x 232, 236 (3d
Cir. 2020).
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TABLE 1: RISKS AND FACTORS USED BY CIRCUITS IN
DETERMINING JOINT VENTURES FOR WIRETAPS IN DRUG CASES
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The circuit “split” regarding the different rules and factors
courts rely on can be described as the First, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits versus the Second and Third Circuits. Given
the similar factors courts use to evaluate joint ventures under
each rule, the variety of rules that the circuits use represents
more of a divergence in naming conventions than a divergence in
the factors themselves. However, circuits weigh the factors within
the rules differently. Therefore, focusing on the rules themselves
overlooks the variability among circuits. The rules do not set
standard factors that courts must evaluate under each rule, nor
do they provide guidance on how to weigh the factors that are
considered. Consequently, circuits choose which factors to evaluate and weigh them differently. This makes venue important in
determining whether a court will find that a joint venture existed.
The following sections describe the factors that courts use to
establish a joint venture under each rule. Part II.A.1 explains the
factors involved in the substantial participation rule by looking
at cases from the Ninth Circuit. Part II.A.2 describes the factors
involved in evaluating the virtual agent rule with a case from the
Second Circuit. Lastly, Part II.A.3 uses a Second Circuit case to
examine the analysis for the intent to evade the Constitution rule.
1. Substantial participation.
Under the substantial participation rule, courts determine
whether U.S. law enforcement involvement with foreign law enforcement was substantial enough to constitute a joint venture.91
The First,92 Ninth,93 Tenth,94 and Eleventh95 Circuits and the
D.D.C.96 use the substantial participation rule in their joint venture analyses. Unlike the Byars-Lustig test,97 the substantial participation rule requires more than U.S. law enforcement having a
hand in the foreign wiretap. In determining whether U.S. law

91
92
93

See, e.g., Barona, 56 F.3d at 1091.
See, e.g., Valdivia, 680 F.3d at 52; Mitro, 880 F.2d at 1482.
See Peterson, 812 F.2d at 490; Barona, 56 F.3d at 1091 (citing Peterson, 812 F.2d

at 490).
94

See, e.g., Delaplane, 778 F.2d at 573.
See, e.g., Emmanuel, 565 F.3d at 1330 (citing Rosenthal, 793 F.2d at 1231); Behety,
32 F.3d at 511 (noting that DEA agents being aboard a ship during the search and videotaping the search did not create a joint venture because they did not assist Guatemalan
officials in the physical search).
96 See, e.g., Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 4.
97 See, e.g., Lustig, 338 U.S. at 78–79 (“The crux of . . . [the test] is that a search is a
search by a federal official if he had a hand in it.”).
95
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enforcement participation in a search was substantial enough to
create a joint venture, the Ninth Circuit emphasizes who initiated
and controlled the wiretap.98 The question of initiation or control
asks whether U.S. law enforcement requested the wiretap, participated in decoding or translating the wiretap, and obtained information from the wiretap.99 Although the absence of these factors did not negate finding a joint venture in Lustig,100 the modern
international silver platter doctrine stresses their importance.
One of the issues with the current application of the substantial participation rule is that courts weigh the factors comprising
the substantial participation rule differently.101 This leads to
some courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, finding joint ventures
more frequently than others.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Peterson102
exemplifies how it evaluates whether a joint venture existed
when U.S. law enforcement officers were not physically present
during a wiretap. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agents notified Thai law enforcement of a scheme to smuggle marijuana from Thailand into the United States.103 The DEA agents
identified Stephen Falk and Timothy Peterson as participants,
and with this information, Thai officials wiretapped Falk’s and
Peterson’s phones.104 The intercepted communications provided
DEA and Thai officials with information on two ships that Falk
and Peterson used to transport drugs: the Allyson and Pacific
Star.105 The DEA notified Philippine authorities when these ships
were en route to the Philippines.106 Philippine law enforcement
then began monitoring Falk, tapped his radios and phone, and
intercepted communications about the location of the Pacific
Star.107 Subsequently, Philippine law enforcement provided the

98 See, e.g., Peterson, 812 F.2d at 490; Barona, 56 F.3d at 1096; United States v.
LaChapelle, 869 F.2d 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding no joint venture because U.S. law
enforcement did not initiate or control the wiretap); see also United States v. Maher, 645
F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding no agency relationship between U.S. and Canadian
law enforcement because Canadian law enforcement initiated and controlled the wiretap
and U.S. law enforcement only assisted when the defendant entered the United States).
99 See Peterson, 812 F.2d at 490; Barona, 56 F.3d at 1090.
100 Lustig, 338 U.S. at 78–79.
101 See infra Part III.
102 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987).
103 Id. at 488.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Peterson, 812 F.2d at 488–89.
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DEA with the Pacific Star’s coordinates, which the DEA conveyed
to the U.S. Coast Guard.108 With this information, the Coast
Guard located, boarded, and searched the Pacific Star and recovered marijuana.109 The defense challenged the search in part as
the fruit of illegal wiretaps conducted by Philippine law enforcement, which triggered a joint venture analysis.110
The Ninth Circuit concluded that a joint venture existed between the DEA agents and Philippine law enforcement because
the DEA substantially participated in the wiretap.111 The DEA’s
role was not “subordinate to the role of [the] Philippine authorities” because the U.S. agents translated and decoded the wiretaps
daily and advised Philippine authorities of their relevance.112 The
DEA also treated the marijuana as destined for the United States,
thus assuming a substantial role in the investigation.113 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit supported its finding of a joint venture by
referencing a U.S. agent’s trial testimony that the DEA conducted
a “joint investigation” with Philippine authorities.114
The First, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and the D.D.C. follow
a similar analysis to the Ninth Circuit—but these courts either
place less emphasis on how law enforcement agents describe their
relationship or have not had the opportunity to consider the relationship at all.115 When courts weigh factors differently, joint venture findings become variable across jurisdictions even with the
same facts.
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion to Peterson in
United States v. Barona116 with respect to wiretaps conducted in
Denmark. Barona involved a series of related investigations in
Denmark and Italy culminating in the arrest of Maria Barona for
trafficking cocaine into the United States on behalf of Mario
Ernesto Villabona-Alvarado (Villabona) and Brian Bennett.117
DEA agents had surveilled Villabona traveling to Copenhagen
108

Id. at 489.
Id. U.S. law enforcement searched both the Allyson and the Pacific Star, but the
discussion of the legality of the searches of the ships is outside the scope of this Comment.
110 Id. at 489.
111 See Id. at 490.
112 Peterson, 812 F.2d at 490.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See, e.g., Valdivia, 680 F.3d at 52 (finding that a DEA agent describing an investigation with Turkish authorities as “our investigation” did not factor into the joint venture analysis).
116 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1995).
117 Id. at 1089.
109
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and Aalborg, Denmark and Milan, Italy.118 As part of their investigation, the DEA agents asked Danish law enforcement to place
wiretaps on two Danish phone numbers used by Villabona; these
wiretaps revealed incriminating conversations.119 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that U.S. participation in the Danish wiretap
was so substantial as to constitute a joint venture.120 Three factors
influenced its analysis: the DEA agents had asked Danish police
to place the wiretaps, had immediately obtained intercepts from
the wiretaps, and had provided the Danish police with an interpreter.121 However, the Ninth Circuit also found that the wiretap
conducted in Milan by Italian officers did not constitute a joint
venture.122 Unlike the Danish wiretaps, the Italian officers had
received authorization from a local court to place the wiretap,123
making U.S. involvement in the wiretap unsubstantial under the
Ninth Circuit’s test for substantial participation.
Although the Ninth Circuit often considers the substantial
participation rule on its own,124 the First,125 Tenth,126 and Eleventh
Circuits,127 the D.D.C.,128 and sometimes the Ninth Circuit129 evaluate the substantial participation rule together with the virtual
agent rule.
2. Virtual agent.
Under the virtual agent rule, a joint venture exists “where
the conduct of foreign law enforcement officials rendered them
agents, or virtual agents, of United States law enforcement officials.”130 This rule comes from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
118

Id. at 1090.
Id.
120 Id. at 1094.
121 Barona, 56 F.3d at 1090.
122 Id. at 1096.
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., id. at 1091 (citing Peterson, 812 F.2d at 490).
125 See, e.g., Valdivia, 680 F.3d at 52; Mitro, 880 F.2d at 1482 (finding no joint venture
because defendant Paul Mitro did “not allege[ ] nor [was] there any indication that American agents participated in the Canadian wiretap or that the [Royal Canadian Mounted
Police] acted as mere agents for [the] DEA”).
126 See, e.g., Delaplane, 778 F.2d at 573.
127 See, e.g., Emmanuel, 565 F.3d at 1330 (noting that a joint venture existed “if American law enforcement officials substantially participated in the search or if the foreign
officials conducting the search were actually acting as agents for their American counterparts” (citing Rosenthal, 793 F.2d at 1231)); Behety, 32 F.3d at 511.
128 See, e.g., Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 4–6.
129 See, e.g., Maher, 645 F.2d at 783.
130 Maturo, 982 F.2d at 61.
119
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Byars, where the Court evaluated whether “the effect [of the coordinated federal and local activity] is the same as though [federal law enforcement] had engaged in the undertaking as one exclusively his own.”131 The Byars Court described this as federal
officers having a hand in the local search.132 When evaluating the
virtual agent rule today—like in the analysis of the substantial
participation rule—courts require more than U.S. law enforcement having a hand in the wiretap to establish an agency relationship, unlike under the Byars-Lustig test. All circuits that
have evaluated the joint venture exception in the wiretap context
have looked at whether a joint venture existed under the virtual
agent rule. The First,133 Ninth,134 Tenth,135 and Eleventh
Circuits136 and the D.D.C.137 all use the same factors—initiation
and control of the wiretap—to satisfy both the substantial participation and virtual agent rules.
The Second138 and Third139 Circuits also use the virtual agent
rule. However, the Second Circuit has explicitly noted that it does
not consider the virtual agent rule to be synonymous with the
substantial participation rule nor with the phrase “joint venture.”140 Despite this professed aversion, the Second and Third
Circuits use the same factors as the First, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits and the D.D.C.
Although the different circuits invoke different factors, all of
the circuits undervalue key forms of cooperation. For example,
they all undervalue cooperation agreements. The Second and

131

Byars, 273 U.S. at 33.
See id.
133 See, e.g., Valdivia, 680 F.3d at 52; Mitro, 880 F.2d at 1482.
134 See Maher, 645 F.2d at 783.
135 See Delaplane, 778 F.2d at 574 (concluding that there was no joint venture between U.S. and Canadian officials because “the investigation leading to the Canadian
wiretap was solely Canadian in nature” and U.S. law enforcement only became involved
after Canadian officials executed the wiretaps).
136 See Emmanuel, 565 F.3d at 1330 (citing Rosenthal, 793 F.2d at 1231).
137 See Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 5–6.
138 See Maturo, 982 F.2d at 61; Getto, 729 F.3d at 228, 230.
139 See Minaya, 827 F. App’x at 236 (“[T]he foreign officials are acting as ‘agents . . .
of United States law enforcement.’” (quoting Maturo, 982 F.2d at 61)).
140 Getto, 729 F.3d at 233 (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s deterrent purpose “is
not served in instances where American law enforcement officers, not intentionally seeking to evade our Constitution, participate in a so-called ‘joint venture’ but do not direct or
otherwise control the investigation”).
132
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Third Circuits also undervalue robust information sharing between U.S. and foreign law enforcement.141
When determining who initiated and controlled the wiretap
under the virtual agent rule, no circuits have treated cooperation
agreements between the United States and a foreign country as
evidence of a joint venture.142 In United States v. Lee,143 the Second
Circuit evaluated the impact of a cooperation agreement—called
the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)—between the United
States and Jamaica. The Jamaican Constabulary Force Narcotics
Division Vetted Unit (VU) and U.S. law enforcement conducted
separate but parallel investigations of Stephen Lee, a suspected
narcotics trafficker.144 At the time, the MOU required Jamaican
law enforcement to “monitor intercepted phone conversations authorized by Jamaican court orders” and provide the DEA with evidence to help in narcotics investigations.145 In exchange, the
United States gave the VU surveillance equipment and training.146 The Second Circuit found that the MOU did not make the
VU agents of U.S. law enforcement.147 It explained that cooperation agreements provide for generalized assistance to foreign law
enforcement entities, not for cooperation on specific investigations.148 The Second Circuit noted that joint venture findings must
relate to specific investigations; therefore, the MOU did not indicate that a joint venture existed.149
3. Intent to evade the Constitution.
Under the intent to evade the Constitution rule, a joint venture exists if U.S. law enforcement cooperated with foreign law
enforcement to “evade constitutional requirements applicable to
American officials.”150 Like the virtual agent rule, the intent to
evade the Constitution rule also stems from the Byars-Lustig test.
141 See Getto, 729 F.3d at 231 (stating that mere, albeit robust, information sharing
and cooperation across parallel investigations do no demonstrate that a foreign-led investigation was controlled or directed by U.S. law enforcement).
142 Courts also do not evaluate cooperation agreements under the substantial participation rule.
143 723 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2013).
144 Id. at 137.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See id. at 141.
148 See Lee, 723 F.3d at 141; see also United States v. Angulo-Hurtado, 165 F. Supp.
2d 1363, 1371 (2001).
149 See Lee, 723 F.3d at 141; Angulo-Hurtado, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.
150 Maturo, 982 F.2d at 61.
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This rule aims to prevent U.S. law enforcement from skirting the
warrant and probable cause requirements applicable to domestic
searches by working together with foreign law enforcement operating abroad and governed by foreign law.
United States v. Maturo151 demonstrates the Second Circuit’s
application of the intent to evade the Constitution rule. In evaluating whether U.S. law enforcement used foreign wiretaps to
evade constitutional requirements, the Second Circuit in Maturo
considered why U.S. law enforcement did not wiretap U.S. phone
numbers.152 In making calls to Turkish phone numbers, the
defendant randomly used pay phones with different telephone
numbers in the United States, which made it difficult for law enforcement to establish a consistent domestic number for a U.S.based wiretap.153 As a result, U.S. law enforcement relied on the
Turkish National Police (TNP) to initiate the wiretap on Turkish
phone numbers.154 The Second Circuit concluded that the Turkish
wiretaps were not an attempt by U.S. law enforcement to evade
constitutional requirements associated with a domestic wiretap
because practical necessity mandated cooperation with foreign officials.155
Although the intent to evade the constitution rule stems from
the Byars-Lustig test, few circuits use this test, and it does not
actually offer constitutional protections. The rule also does not
clarify what constitutes a joint venture. In fact, it is self-defeating. If courts find that U.S. law enforcement intended to evade
constitutional requirements, then U.S. law enforcement and foreign law enforcement cooperation constituted a joint venture. If a
joint venture existed, courts will look to foreign law to determine
whether the evidence from the wiretap should be admissible in
court. Foreign law often falls below the probable cause and warrant requirements associated with domestic searches under the
Fourth Amendment. Therefore, perversely, finding a joint venture existed because of intent to evade the Constitution fulfills
U.S. law enforcement’s goal of circumventing U.S. constitutional
standards.
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982 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 62 (“[I]t is clear that the TNP’s wiretapping of phones in Turkey was
prompted not by a desire to circumvent constitutional constraints, but by the logistical
problem caused by Pontillo’s random selection of pay phones.”).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See id.
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After courts evaluate whether a joint venture existed under
one or more of the three abovementioned rules, courts then analyze foreign law to determine whether the wiretap was reasonable
and apply the good faith exception if the wiretap failed to comply
with foreign law. These next two steps of the joint venture–exception analysis potentially provide defendants with a greater degree
of protection than if the court finds no joint venture. Courts rarely
find joint ventures in wiretaps and accordingly rarely proceed to
the analysis of foreign law. In practice, this means that courts
often admit intercepted wiretap communications without checking if the wiretap complied with the law where it occurred. As a
result, illegally intercepted communications are used as key evidence in U.S. federal courts against narcotics defendants.
B. Analysis of Foreign Law
After establishing the existence of a joint venture between
U.S. and foreign law enforcement, courts look to the law of the
country where the wiretap occurred to determine if the wiretap
was reasonable.156 This highlights the importance of courts finding that a joint venture existed. If courts do not find that one existed, the analysis ends, and evidence intercepted from wiretaps
is admissible regardless of the interception’s legality under any
legal system. Finding that a joint venture existed at least provides the minimal protection that the wiretap must comply with
the law of the country where it occurred, even if that law provides
reduced protection relative to Fourth Amendment requirements.
If the search complies with foreign law, the search is considered
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.157 If reasonable, courts
admit the wiretap evidence.158
Ninth Circuit case law provides two examples of courts evaluating foreign law to determine whether a wiretap was reasonable. These examples are also instances where foreign law does not
provide comparable protections to the warrant and probable
cause requirements for domestic searches. Foreign laws often require neither a warrant nor probable cause to place wiretaps.159
This means that U.S. law enforcement officers do not need a warrant supported by probable cause when they engage in a joint
156 See Barona, 56 F.3d at 1093. For purposes of this Comment, a wiretap “occurs” on
foreign soil if the target of the wiretap is physically located outside of the United States.
157 See id. (citing Peterson, 812 F.2d at 491).
158 See id.
159 See, e.g., id. at 1101 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Peterson, 812 F.2d at 491.
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venture with foreign law enforcement to wiretap U.S. citizens.
Yet U.S. courts usually admit evidence from joint venture wiretaps against U.S. citizens.
Peterson is a case in which the Ninth Circuit analyzed foreign
law that does not have warrant and probable cause requirements.
After concluding that a joint venture existed between U.S. and
Philippine law enforcement, the court evaluated the wiretap under Philippine law and determined that the wiretap was illegal.160
This necessitated an analysis of the good faith exception, discussed in Part II.C below. For many enumerated crimes, Philippine law at the time of Peterson did not require that courts find
that officers had probable cause to authorize a wiretap, and for
other crimes touching on public safety, law enforcement could bypass courts altogether. The Ninth Circuit held that placing a
wiretap in this context required court authorization for two reasons: (1) “no Philippine court decision” had interpreted the public
safety exception to include narcotics trafficking and investigations, and (2) the Ninth Circuit concluded that Philippine courts
had a noted preference for maximizing individual liberties.161
Conversely, in Barona, which involved joint venture wiretaps
obtained by U.S. and Danish officials, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the wiretaps complied with Danish law.162 Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit found that the Danish wiretaps were reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment and admitted the recorded communications into evidence.163 If the Barona court had not found a
joint venture existed, the wiretap would have been automatically
admissible without an analysis of foreign law. The foreign law
analysis at least ensured that the wiretap was legal in Denmark
before introducing the recorded communications into evidence,
even if the Danish standard for placing a wiretap was not comparable to the Fourth Amendment’s domestic probable cause requirement.164
Mexico’s prominence as one of the United States’ biggest narcotics threats means that many narcotics cases originate in
Mexico.165 This underscores the importance of Mexican law
160 Peterson, 812 F.2d at 491 (first citing An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, Rep. Act No. 4200,
§ 1–3 (June 19, 1965) (Phil.); and then citing PHIL. CONST. art. VI, § 4).
161 Id.
162 See Barona, 56 F.3d at 1096.
163 See id.
164 See id. at 1101 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
165 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC, supra note 1, at 21.
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regarding wiretaps. In Mexico, the judicial criteria to authorize
wiretaps remains unclear. One Mexican government official
noted that “everyone [wiretaps] as if it were a sport.”166 The statutes, codes, and laws in Mexico support that claim because they
broadly authorize police to engage in wiretapping without many
protections against government invasions of privacy. The Código
Nacional de Procedimientos Penales (National Code of Criminal
Procedures) authorizes the Mexican Attorney General or delegated persons to request authorization from a court to intercept
communications of individuals “when the Public Prosecutor
deems it necessary.”167 These requests need only state the objective and necessity of the wiretap.168
Similarly, the Ley de la Policía Federal (Federal Police Law)
authorizes Mexican police to request judicial authorization of
wiretaps in writing for specific enumerated crimes, including
money laundering and violent offenses related to organized
crime.169 These crimes often occur alongside drug trafficking. One
Mexican statute, the Ley Federal Contra la Delincuencia
Organizada (Federal Law Against Organized Crime), specifies
that requests for wiretaps “be duly justified by reasons of fact and
law.”170 None of the abovementioned laws match the requirements
for U.S. domestic searches. But they still provide some protection
for defendants. Requiring joint venture wiretaps to comply with
foreign law provides more protection than allowing the admission
of wiretap evidence that does not comply with foreign law.
C. The Good Faith Exception
If the wiretap does not comply with foreign law, courts analyze whether the evidence from the wiretap is still admissible under the good faith exception. Under this exception, courts admit
illegally obtained evidence but still provide defendants with more
protections than if the court had found no joint venture existed to
start. Because courts rarely find joint ventures (and thus rarely
evaluate whether wiretaps complied with foreign law), analyses
of the good faith exception are scarce. The good faith exception

166 Reuters Staff, Mexican Senate Majority Leader Favors Wiretapping Regulation,
REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/PJ29-YNDW.
167 See Privacy International & Red in Defensa de los Derechos Digitales, State of
Privacy Mexico, PRIV. INT’L (Jan. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/9Z54-S2TH.
168 See id.
169 See id.
170 See id.
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applies if U.S. agents “reasonably rel[y] on [ ] representations
that the wiretaps were legal under [foreign] law.”171
In Peterson, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the good faith
exception applied.172 Although the wiretap did not comply with
Philippine law, “federal officers sought, and received, assurances
from high ranking law enforcement authorities in the Philippines
that all necessary authorization was being obtained.”173 Because
U.S. law enforcement relied on these representations while participating in the wiretap, the good faith exception applied, and the
court admitted the wiretap evidence.174
Although the good faith exception essentially allows courts to
admit illegally intercepted communications into evidence, going
through the steps of evaluating foreign law and applying the good
faith exception still provides narcotics defendants with greater
constitutional protections than if a court had not found a joint
venture in the first place. Evidence from illegal wiretaps is admissible under the good faith exception only if U.S. law
enforcement can demonstrate that they reasonably relied on representations that the wiretap had complied with foreign law.175 In
contrast, when a court does not find that a joint venture existed
and does not reach the good faith exception step, evidence from
illegal wiretaps is admissible regardless of the legality of the wiretap and regardless of whether U.S. law enforcement knew that
the wiretap was illegal. Under the good faith exception, if U.S.
law enforcement blatantly ignored warnings that the wiretap was
illegal, the intercepted communications from the wiretap would
not be admissible. Because there is only one example of the good
faith exception’s application in the narcotics wiretap context, it is
unclear how difficult it is in practice to meet the “reasonably rely”
threshold. Even if it is not a difficult threshold to meet, it still
provides greater protection than if courts did not engage in this
analysis at all.
III. CREATING A UNIFORM BALANCING TEST TO ESTABLISH A
JOINT VENTURE
A key issue in the application of the joint venture exception
is that circuits lack a uniform test for determining what
171
172
173
174
175

Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 6.
See Peterson, 812 F.2d at 492.
Id.
See id.
See Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 6.
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constitutes a joint venture. This causes courts to undervalue some
forms of cooperation between the United States and foreign countries, such as cooperation agreements. When courts undervalue
forms of cooperation, they are less likely to find a joint venture,
resulting in courts admitting intercepted communications from
joint venture wiretaps regardless of whether they were legally obtained. Relatedly, it also makes venue play a crucial role in the
joint venture determination. In the wiretap context, only the
Ninth Circuit has found joint ventures to exist in narcotics cases,
and it did so by taking a broad view of what constitutes a joint
venture. This translates into only the Ninth Circuit evaluating
the legality of joint venture wiretaps. All other courts have simply
allowed the intercepted communications into evidence regardless
of the legality of the wiretap under foreign law.
Advancements in technology allow U.S. law enforcement to
engage in remote wiretaps with foreign law enforcement, which
makes joint venture findings even less likely.176 It is harder to conclude that U.S. law enforcement officials have control over a wiretap when they are not located in the foreign country where the
wiretap occurred. Despite technological advances making remote
cooperation easier and more frequent, physical presence still
plays an important role in the joint venture analysis, creating difficulties in finding joint ventures in remote contexts. This again
raises the issue that because courts rarely find joint ventures exist in the wiretap context, illegally obtained evidence from these
wiretaps is admissible. To address this issue, I propose a balancing test. Given courts’ reluctance to conclude that a joint venture
existed based on a single factor,177 a balancing test seems more
appropriate than a bright-line rule.
Table 1 demonstrates that courts evaluate similar factors in
wiretap cases despite their purported use of different rules.
Therefore, the variety in the rules represents more of a difference
in naming convention than a difference between the factors considered by the circuits. The nomenclature creates the illusion of
unnecessary discord between the circuits. Thus, in my proposal, I
discard the named rules and focus on the factors that courts use.
Based on the empirical analysis and policy considerations
discussed in further detail in the first three sections of this Part,
I propose a balancing test for determining whether a joint venture

176
177

See Street, supra note 27, at 441.
See supra Part II.A.
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between U.S. and foreign law enforcement exists. Part III.A introduces the first factor of this test: who initiated or controlled the
wiretap. This factor turns on (1) who requested, initiated, supervised, and intercepted the wiretap, which includes evaluating
whether U.S. law enforcement participation was active,
(2) whether U.S. law enforcement received intercepted communications from the wiretap, and (3) who initiated the investigation
into the defendant. Part III.B discusses the second factor:
whether U.S. law enforcement provided substantial resources to
foreign law enforcement, including whether the United States offered translation services during or after the wiretap interception
and whether the United States has or had a cooperation agreement with the foreign country. Part III.C introduces the final factor: how U.S. and foreign law enforcement agents describe their
cooperation in court. Part III.D then discusses factors that should
not be considered in the balancing test. Finally, Part III.E concludes with applications of the proposed balancing test.
Table 1 guided my reasoning for including the first factor in
my proposal.178 However, for my second and third factors, I focused less on the frequency of use of the factors and more on the
level of cooperation the factors described. Table 1 was still helpful
for my second and third factors because it allowed me to understand which factors courts undervalue. My balancing test differs
from the status quo because it elevates important factors that
courts currently give little weight to in their analyses, imposes a
clear set of factors courts must evaluate, and eliminates unhelpful factors. My balancing test goes even further than the Ninth
Circuit’s factors under the substantial participation and virtual
agent rules—currently the broadest interpretation of what constitutes a joint venture with respect to narcotics-related wiretaps—by including cooperation agreements in the joint venture
calculus.179
A. Initiation or Control of the Wiretap
Most circuits focus on who initiated or controlled the wiretap—questions courts generally consider under the virtual agent
and substantial participation rules.180 I propose focusing on the

178

See supra Part II.A.1–2; Table 1.
See Barona, 56 F.3d at 1091 (citing Peterson, 812 F.2d at 490); United States v.
Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1981).
180 See supra Part II.A.1–2; Table 1.
179

2022]

The Joint Venture Exception

1905

key factors that circuits evaluate rather than engaging in a
separate analysis of whether U.S. and foreign law enforcement
cooperation constitutes an agency relationship or substantial participation. This would reduce pushback from the Second and
Third Circuits, which profess an aversion to the joint venture doctrine and only use the virtual agent and intent to evade the Constitution rules.181 In my proposal, the more factors that indicate
U.S. control of the wiretap, the greater U.S. involvement in the
law enforcement enterprise, which should correspond to a greater
likelihood of finding that a joint venture existed.
The empirical data in Table 1 guided my reasoning for including initiation or control of the wiretap. Including key factors that
courts already rely on in a new proposed balancing test can encourage judicial buy-in to my proposal. Additionally, courts rely
heavily on analyzing who initiated or controlled the wiretap because these factors implicate the core responsibilities and access
that U.S. law enforcement officers have when conducting wiretaps on their own. In working with foreign law enforcement, the
more U.S. law enforcement personnel act as if they exclusively
conduct the wiretap, the greater the likelihood of finding a joint
venture.
The questions of who initiated or controlled the wiretap encompass a few subsidiary questions addressed below. Part III.A.1
discusses requesting, initiating, supervising, and intercepting the
wiretap, which includes evaluating whether participation by U.S.
law enforcement in the wiretap was active. Part III.A.2 evaluates
whether U.S. law enforcement received intercepted communications from the wiretap, and Part III.A.3 analyzes the initiation of
the investigation.
1. Requesting, initiating, supervising, and intercepting the
wiretap and active participation in the wiretap.
Circuits tend to lean most heavily on who requested or initiated the wiretap and who supervised and intercepted the wiretap.182 I include these factors in my analysis because they
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See United States v. Getto, 729 F.3d 221, 233 (2d Cir. 2013).
See, e.g., Maturo, 982 F.2d at 59, 61; United States v. Minaya, 827 F. App’x 232,
236–37 (3d Cir. 2020); Lee, 723 F.3d at 141; United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 712
(2d Cir. 1975); Barona, 56 F.3d at 1090; United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33, 52 (1st
Cir. 2012); United States v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Mitro, 880 F.2d 1480, 1481 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. LaChapelle, 869 F.2d 488,
182
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encompass key elements of U.S. control over the wiretap. If U.S.
law enforcement requested that foreign law enforcement place
the wiretap, it indicates some U.S. command over the process. For
example, in Barona, the DEA requested that Danish law enforcement place the wiretap.183 DEA agents thus acted as the catalyst
for wiretapping the suspects. Without the DEA’s request, it is unclear whether Danish law enforcement would have placed the
wiretap. Using this factor in my proposed balancing test carries
forward courts’ past practice of analyzing who initiated the wiretap and should continue to be considered as strong evidence of a
joint venture.
Initiating the wiretap means placing the government wire on
the target phone’s wires,184 installing a listening device,185 or contacting the cell phone provider.186 When foreign law enforcement
members initiate a wiretap on their own, the United States does
not play as central a role in the wiretap (as compared to when the
United States works together with foreign law enforcement), and
thus the Fourth Amendment should not be implicated. If U.S. law
enforcement members initiate or supervise and intercept the
wiretap, they play a role similar to the one they would play if they
conducted the wiretap on their own. This demonstrates U.S. control over the wiretap and ought to be considered strong evidence
in favor of finding a joint venture.
A related question is whether U.S. law enforcement participation is active. Active participation can include U.S. officers
placing the wiretaps on phone lines or intercepting conversations
from the wiretaps in real time.187 These are actions that domestic
officers would take in U.S.-exclusive wiretaps, which indicates
U.S. control over a wiretap. Intercepting communications involves listening to or reading the conversations from the wiretap
in real time.

490 (9th Cir. 1989); Maher, 645 F.2d at 783; United States v. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1,
5–6 (D.D.C. 2007).
183 Barona, 56 F.3d at 1090.
184 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928).
185 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
186 See Sun, supra note 38.
187 Cf. Valdivia, 680 F.3d at 52 (“Aruban officers actively participated in the implementation of wiretaps and recording of conversations.”).
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2. Receiving intercepted communications from the wiretap.
The Ninth Circuit also evaluates whether U.S. law enforcement received information from wiretaps placed by foreign law
enforcement when determining who controlled the wiretap.188
Receiving intercepted communications differs from active participation in timing: receiving intercepted communications happens
after intercepting the communication, while active participation
involves U.S. law enforcement intercepting communications in
real time. For example, in Barona, Danish police intercepted communications on the wiretap and then immediately provided the
DEA access to those intercepted conversations.189 The DEA did
not listen to the conversations as they were intercepted in real
time, but it still gained access to them later, which indicates some
U.S. participation in the wiretap. The more participation and control domestic officers have over a joint venture wiretap, the
stronger the evidence that a joint venture exists.
Not every circuit considers this factor under the current joint
venture analysis. For instance, the Second Circuit does not consider “robust information sharing and cooperation across parallel
investigations” between U.S. and foreign law enforcement as
demonstrating that U.S. law enforcement controlled or directed
the investigation.190 In disregarding this factor, the Second
Circuit undervalues an important form of cooperation. I include
this factor in my new balancing test because access to information
indicates control over a wiretap just as denial of information indicates a lack of control. For example, foreign law enforcement
restricting U.S. law enforcement’s access to information obtained
from wiretaps demonstrates the former’s dominance in the wiretap. Therefore, if U.S. law enforcement personnel receive access
to information, they should be considered to have played a larger
role in the wiretap. Similarly, the more information they receive
without restriction, the stronger the inference of U.S. control and
the more likely a joint venture existed.
Courts will be more likely to find joint ventures if their
analyses include an inquiry into who listened to or read the conversations from the wiretaps. U.S. law enforcement may not have
complete control over administering the wiretap, but if they
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See Peterson, 812 F.2d at 490; Barona, 56 F.3d at 1094.
See Barona, 56 F.3d at 1094 (“[The] information obtained was immediately forwarded to [U.S. officers].”).
190 See Getto, 729 F.3d at 231.
189
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receive access to the intercepted communications, they still play
a large role in the wiretapping process. This role should be
recognized as cooperation under the joint venture exception. Recognizing that receipt of wiretapped communications indicates
substantial U.S. law enforcement involvement in the enterprise
would reduce the threshold for finding that a joint venture existed. This in turn would increase defendants’ constitutional protections against illegal intrusions into their privacy that lead to
having illegally obtained evidence used against them in court. My
proposal aims to achieve this goal not by reducing what constitutes a joint venture to a meaningless standard that applies in all
cases but by accurately capturing what cooperation looks like between U.S. and foreign law enforcement.
3. Initiation of the investigation.
Determining who initiated the investigation into the defendant can also help clarify the extent of U.S. involvement in the
wiretap. Typically, when the United States initiates an investigation, it also exerts some level of power in determining the scope of
the investigation. This power could include asking foreign law enforcement to place wiretaps on specific targets as part of a broader
investigation, like in Barona. Recall that in Barona, DEA agents
began investigating Barona for trafficking cocaine and then asked
Danish law enforcement to place wiretaps on him and additional
suspects.191 Similar to the factors above, this also can demonstrate
extensive U.S. cooperation with foreign law enforcement in a
wiretap, but it is not a necessary factor for a joint venture to exist.
Even if the United States did not initiate the investigation, U.S.
initiation of the wiretap should weigh in favor of finding a joint
venture because the joint venture analysis focuses on the wiretap
and not on the investigation as a whole.
B. Provision of Substantial Resources
Only two circuits consider whether U.S. law enforcement provided substantial resources—like translation services—to foreign
law enforcement,192 but this factor can strongly indicate
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See Barona, 56 F.3d at 1089.
See, e.g., id. at 1094; Peterson, 812 F.2d at 490 (weighing the fact that the DEA
“was involved daily in translating and decoding intercepted transmissions, as well as advising the [foreign] authorities of their relevance” when determining whether there was a
joint venture); Maturo, 982 F.2d at 59.
192
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cooperation in a joint venture. Part III.B.1 discusses translation
as a substantial resource and Part III.B.2 provides the argument
for including cooperation agreements under the “provision of substantial resources” factor.
1. Translation.
Circuits that look at whether the United States provided
substantial resources consider translation services a “substantial
resource” that U.S. officers provide to foreign law enforcement because these services involve substantial time and effort by U.S.
officers.193 Additionally, if U.S. law enforcement were to not provide these translation services, foreign law enforcement would
likely need to separately pay someone to translate the wiretaps
for them. When U.S. law enforcement officers translate intercepted wiretaps from foreign languages into English, they
demonstrate their intention to use the wiretaps—similar to how
translation from English to a foreign language indicates foreign
law enforcement’s intention to use the wiretaps.194 To use a wiretap in U.S. courts, the evidence must be presented in English for
the judge and jury to understand. On this view, translation describes quintessential U.S. involvement and should be evidence
of a joint venture. Foreign law enforcement officers conduct the
wiretap and U.S. law enforcement officers create the finished
product to use in prosecutions.
2. Cooperation agreements.
More broadly, the provision of substantial resources can indicate that a strong, codified relationship between U.S. and foreign
law enforcement existed. Cooperation agreements provide an example of these codified relationships. They facilitate information
sharing between countries and create financial commitments for
the United States to provide foreign countries with money to fund
increases in police personnel, police training, and intelligencegathering equipment.195 Given those considerations, my proposal
contends that the existence of a cooperation agreement between
the U.S. and another country should strongly indicate evidence of
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See, e.g., Barona, 56 F.3d at 1094.
See Maturo, 982 F.2d at 59, 61 (concluding that Turkish officers asking U.S. officers to translate English wiretaps into Turkish demonstrates that the Turkish officers
planned to use the wiretaps in their own independent investigation).
195 See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 31, at 14–18.
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a joint venture. These agreements are common196 and memorialize cooperation between U.S. and foreign law enforcement.
Previous literature on the joint venture exception has overlooked the issue posed by cooperation agreements and their absence from the joint venture analysis. For example, Caitlin Street
noted that counterterrorism agreements between the United
States and foreign countries would have an impact on the joint
venture analysis.197 This assertion presupposes that courts currently take these cooperation agreements into account, when they
do not.
Cooperation agreements have previously been insufficient to
constitute a joint venture.198 Courts argue that cooperation agreements do not shed light on the specific cooperation between U.S.
and foreign law enforcement required to form a joint venture.
They posit that while cooperation agreements describe the
general relationship between the United States and a foreign
country, the joint venture analysis is a fact-specific, case-by-case
determination.
Placing an emphasis on the general versus specific nature of
the cooperation-agreement–joint venture analysis overlooks, and
as a result undervalues, a key form of cooperation between U.S.
and foreign law enforcement. Cooperation agreements create the
foundations upon which U.S. and foreign law enforcement work
together. Therefore, my balancing test proposes that courts
should consider cooperation agreements in their joint venture determinations as prima facie evidence of a joint venture.
Agreements like the Mérida Initiative, the U.S.-Mexico
Bicentennial Framework for Security, and the MOU with
Jamaica should raise red flags. For example, the national security
threat posed by both governmental officials and private actors in
Mexico encourages cooperation between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement to investigate and prosecute narcotics violations.199 Until recently, this cooperation across investigations operated
largely under the Mérida Initiative, which emphasized “shared

196 See id. (describing U.S.-funded countrywide and regional initiatives in Mexico,
Central America, the Caribbean, Colombia, Afghanistan, and West Africa).
197 See, e.g., Street, supra note 27, at 446 n.155.
198 See Lee, 723 F.3d at 141.
199 See BEITTEL & ROSEN, supra note 12, at 2; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. DRUG ENF’T
ADMIN., supra note 5, at 65; JUNE S. BEITTEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41576, MEXICO:
ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS 4 (2020).
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responsibility” between the United States and Mexico.200 The
Mérida Initiative was a roughly $3.3 billion “package of U.S. antidrug and rule of law assistance to Mexico [and Central
America]” to assist in “bilateral [security] efforts” between the
United States and Mexico.201 The Initiative led to improvements
in intelligence sharing and cooperation among U.S. and Mexican
police and aided in the capture and extradition of high-profile narcotics players.202
However, corruption of Mexican law enforcement and the
Mexican government weakened the Mérida Initiative and cooperative efforts between the United States and Mexico.203 In its place,
the U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public
Health, and Safe Communities promotes “information exchange,
inter-agency cooperation and training of personnel.”204 Cooperation between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement seems likely to
rise with the new initiative given the Biden administration’s hope
“that cooperation [will be] deepened” under the new agreement.205
The United States also provides similar support to and has cooperation agreements with countries in Latin America, Africa,
Europe, and Asia.206
Under the current formulation of the joint venture exception,
the United States can—and does—provide foreign countries, such
as Mexico, with billions of dollars to support antitrafficking law
enforcement mechanisms, yet courts still find that U.S. and foreign law enforcement cooperation does not constitute a joint venture absent some other form of control, such as initiation of the
wiretap. This means that despite pervasive cooperation and support, courts do not require evidence obtained from these situations to even comply with foreign law.
When the United States and foreign countries have comprehensive cooperation agreements in place, courts should require
evidence collected via these robust collaborative frameworks to
200

CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10578, MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF
MÉRIDA INITIATIVE, FY2007-FY2022, 1 (2021); see ANDRÉS MARTÍNEZ-FERNÁNDEZ,
AM. ENTER. INST., MONEY LAUNDERING AND CORRUPTION IN MEXICO: CONFRONTING
THREATS TO PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND THE US-MEXICO RELATIONSHIP 10 (2021).
201 SEELKE, supra note 200, at 1.
202 BEITTEL, supra note 199, at 4.
203 See, e.g., MARTÍNEZ-FERNÁNDEZ, supra note 200, at 10–11; SEELKE, supra
note 200, at 1.
204 Dave Graham & Drazen Jorgic, U.S., Mexico Prepare New Security Deal to Replace
the Merida Initiative, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/EJW5-8V6J.
205 Id. at 2.
206 See ROSEN, supra note 31, at 14–18; Kenney, supra note 16, at 215.
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comply with the law of the country where the wiretap occurred.
Including cooperation agreements in a uniform balancing test
would resolve the dissonance created by the U.S. government offering financial and personnel assistance to many countries to
combat narcotics trafficking, and yet courts not seeing that assistance as evidence of a joint venture. These agreements provide
key insight into cooperation between U.S. and foreign law enforcement. On its own, evidence of an existing cooperation agreement between the United States and the foreign country involved
in the wiretap should constitute prima facie evidence of a joint
venture. If the two countries have a cooperation agreement,
courts should conclude that a joint venture existed if one of the
other factors discussed in Parts III.A and III.C is present. However, if none of the factors in Parts III.A and III.C are present, the
prima facie case could be rebutted and finding a joint venture
would be more difficult.
A balancing test that includes evaluating whether U.S. law
enforcement provided substantial resources to foreign law enforcement also accounts for remote operations. As technology continues to advance, it allows for U.S. law enforcement to remotely
participate in wiretaps through translation and by receiving electronic copies of transcripts. These factors can be viewed in light
of the overall goal of the joint venture analysis: to provide constitutional protections to defendants. A higher threshold for what
constitutes a joint venture means that fewer wiretaps involving
U.S.-foreign cooperation would constitute a joint venture and that
the intercepted communications from these wiretaps would be admissible regardless of the wiretap’s legality. Requiring a lower
threshold to find that a joint venture existed means that courts
would more often evaluate whether the joint venture wiretap
complied with foreign law. This would lead courts to evaluate
wiretaps under foreign law more regularly, providing increased
constitutional protections for defendants.
Creating a balancing test that lowers the threshold for what
constitutes a joint venture comports with the reasoning of the exclusionary rule. A lower threshold would provide U.S. law enforcement officers participating in joint ventures with incentives
to make sure that wiretaps comply with foreign law, lest the evidence be excluded. A lower threshold for what constitutes a joint
venture would thus deter unlawful behavior by U.S. law enforcement.
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Foreign law enforcement personnel would also have an incentive to make sure that their wiretaps complied with foreign law
because joint ventures involve repeat actors. Especially when cooperation agreements exist between the United States and a foreign state, foreign law enforcement officers have two incentives
to undertake legal wiretaps. First, a successful cooperative relationship between U.S. and foreign law enforcement revolves
around trust. If foreign law enforcement officers continue to illegally wiretap individuals, and this evidence continues to be excluded in U.S. courts, U.S. law enforcement may be less willing to
work with foreign law enforcement because they will not be able
to use any of the evidence obtained by foreign law enforcement.
Second, if a joint venture wiretap is legal under foreign law and
therefore admissible in court under the joint venture exception,
law enforcement will be able to prosecute narcotics traffickers
more easily. The easier it is to prosecute narcotics traffickers, the
more likely they will be incarcerated following the prosecution
and thus no longer pose public safety concerns to the foreign country involved in the joint venture.
C. Describing the Relationship
How U.S. and foreign law enforcement describe their coordination in conducting the wiretap in trial testimony should factor
into whether a joint venture existed. Currently, only the Ninth
Circuit considers this.207 My proposal recommends giving this factor more weight. These descriptions represent how law enforcement officers conceptualize their working relationship. However,
it is important to note that law enforcement agents may describe
their relationship with foreign officers as a joint venture despite
minimal coordination because they do not recognize the legal significance of using the phrase joint venture as a descriptor. For
this reason, courts should not exclusively rely on these descriptions by law enforcement. Yet officers are in the best position to
describe their relationship: they know the most about what their
cooperation with each other in investigations looks like. In cases
where other evidence points to a joint venture, descriptions like
the one in Peterson208 should support finding that a joint venture
existed. This factor could also help categorize more instances of
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remote cooperation enabled by technology as joint ventures. For
the same reasons articulated above, this makes it more likely that
defendants will be provided with some constitutional protections.
D. Factors that Should Not Be Considered
In creating my balancing test, I evaluated other factors that
courts currently consider in their joint venture analyses and eliminated some from consideration that are either not used by many
courts—as shown in Table 1—or do not add any helpful information about U.S.-foreign cooperation to the joint venture analysis. To begin, considering whether foreign courts authorized the
wiretap does not seem like a fruitful factor to include in a uniform
balancing test because it is irrelevant to the question of U.S. participation. If foreign countries require court authorization to conduct a wiretap, foreign authorities would—and should—receive
such authorization regardless of whether U.S. law enforcement
participated in the wiretap.
The intent to evade the Constitution rule should also be left
out of any uniform balancing test for the reasons noted in
Part II.A.3. U.S. law enforcement officers seeking to evade the
constitutional requirements of a domestic search can do so by conducting a search with a foreign law enforcement officer on foreign
soil in a joint venture. Even if a joint venture existed, the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness determination will be based on foreign law, not domestic constitutional requirements. This means
that the intent to evade the Constitution analysis is not a fruitful
inquiry.
E. Applying the Balancing Test
To demonstrate how my proposal changes the joint venture
analysis, I apply it to Lee and Maturo. The Lee example discussed
in Part III.E.1 demonstrates the impact of a cooperation agreement on the joint venture determination. The Maturo example in
Part III.E.2 shows how my proposal operates when no cooperation agreement exists.
1. United States v. Lee: Evidence of a cooperation
agreement constitutes a prima facie case of a joint
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venture.
In Lee, The Jamaican VU and U.S. law enforcement conducted separate but parallel investigations of Lee.209 The MOU
between the United States and Jamaica required Jamaican law
enforcement to conduct wiretaps as requested by U.S. law enforcement and provide interceptions to the DEA.210 In exchange,
the United States provided the VU with surveillance equipment
and training.211 The evidence tends to initially weigh against a
finding of a joint venture under the first factor—initiation or control of the wiretap. This is the only factor that the Second Circuit
evaluated,212 and accordingly, it concluded that a joint venture between U.S. and Jamaican law enforcement did not exist.
In finding that a joint venture between U.S. and Jamaican
law enforcement did not exist, the Second Circuit focused on three
pieces of evidence suggesting that U.S. law enforcement did not
initiate or control the wiretap. First, it found that Jamaican law
enforcement had initiated the investigation into Lee prior to U.S.
authorities and treated that fact as evidence against finding a
joint venture.213 Second, the court emphasized that Jamaican authorities “did not solicit the views, much less approval, of DEA
agents prior to conducting surveillance.”214 Third, the Second
Circuit noted that U.S. law enforcement did not translate or intercept the wiretaps in real time.215
An analysis under my proposed first factor—initiation or control of the wiretap—would not rule out a finding of a joint venture
like the Second Circuit’s analysis did. U.S. and Jamaican law enforcement ran parallel investigations into Lee’s trafficking activities.216 Therefore, the question of which investigation formally
started first seems insignificant. Given that U.S. law enforcement
officers started their investigation later, it makes sense that U.S.
law enforcement joined ongoing Jamaican surveillance efforts.
Additionally, the MOU required the Jamaican VU to conduct
wiretaps as requested by U.S. law enforcement. Although the
Jamaican VU did not solicit the approval or views of the DEA, the
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DEA had the option to play a role in initiating the wiretap. U.S.
law enforcement also ultimately did receive access to all the intercepted wiretaps under the MOU.217 While these factors may indicate that U.S. law enforcement lacked explicit control over the
wiretap, U.S. law enforcement demonstrated cooperation in another significant area: access to information.
The second factor of my proposed balancing test strongly
weighs in favor of finding a joint venture. The United States had
an MOU with Jamaica.218 The MOU created a strong partnership
between U.S. and Jamaican law enforcement that unfolded in
Lee. U.S. law enforcement provided Jamaican law enforcement
with the training and tools that the Jamaican VU utilized to conduct the wiretaps.219 This produced evidence that the VU shared
with U.S. law enforcement for use in U.S. courts.220 This clearly
describes interconnected conduct amounting to a joint venture.
Under my proposed balancing test, the MOU should establish a
prima facie case of a joint venture; that prima facie case is then
supported by the fact that U.S. law enforcement received access
to the intercepted conversations. The third factor of my proposal
is not applicable since U.S. and Jamaican law enforcement officers did not describe their cooperation in court. Balancing the factors, I conclude that a joint venture existed. As exemplified by
applying my proposal to Lee, the proposed uniform balancing test
makes a joint venture finding more likely.
2. United States v. Maturo: Shifting judicial focus to
viewing the evidence in a light favorable to finding a
joint venture.
Absent an explicit cooperation agreement, the joint venture
analysis should focus both on whether the wiretap would have
occurred without U.S. involvement and on what U.S. involvement
looked like. In Maturo, Joseph Samuel Pontillo appealed his conviction of conspiring to and knowingly and intentionally importing heroin.221 Pontillo argued that evidence obtained through a
wiretap conducted by the Turkish National Police (TNP) should
have been suppressed under the exclusionary rule of the Fourth
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Amendment.222 After receiving information from the New York
Port Authority Police that Pontillo was engaged in drug smuggling,223 the DEA began surveilling Pontillo and his codefendant,
John Maturo, and subpoenaed phone records for Pontillo.224 The
records revealed Turkish phone numbers to which Pontillo had
made calls.225 The DEA passed these numbers along to the TNP,
who investigated the numbers and determined that they belonged
to Turkish drug traffickers.226 Then, the TNP obtained authorization from a Turkish court to wiretap those numbers.227
The Second Circuit concluded that the TNP had not acted as
an agent of U.S. law enforcement and therefore did not find that
a joint venture existed. Under my balancing test, the court would
have reached the opposite conclusion. Unlike Lee, no cooperation
agreement between the United States and Turkey existed to
guide the relationship between the TNP and U.S. law enforcement. Similar to Lee, the last factor of my proposal—how the law
enforcement officers describe their participation in court—does
not apply here. Therefore, the analysis should center on my first
factor (initiation and control) and my second factor (provision of
substantial resources, but in this instance, in the absence of a cooperation agreement).
Under my test, the first factor points in favor of finding a joint
venture. The Second Circuit concluded that the DEA did not initiate or control the wiretap after finding that there was no
evidence that the DEA was “involved in the decision to seek a
wiretap.”228 However, the DEA asked Turkish law enforcement for
background information on specific Turkish phone numbers, including the numbers that the DEA agents wanted Turkish police
to wiretap.229 The Second Circuit’s analysis robotically focused on
which law enforcement agents placed the wiretap, overlooking
that the DEA asked to start the wiretap. This strongly indicates
not only that the DEA requested the wiretap but that its participation was instrumental to the wiretap. It is unclear whether,
without prompting from the DEA, the TNP would have placed the
wiretap. Additionally, the DEA received immediate access to the
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wiretap recordings. Together, this demonstrates the DEA’s active
role in the wiretap.
Under my test, the second factor also points in favor of finding a joint venture. Here again, the Second Circuit concluded that
Turkish authorities asking the DEA agents to translate English
conversations to Turkish weighed against a joint venture finding.230 The Second Circuit reasoned that translating the wiretaps
from English to Turkish indicated that Turkish authorities
wanted to use the wiretaps in Turkish proceedings.231 However,
the court’s focus was misplaced. The DEA provided substantial
resources to the TNP through translation. Just because the DEA
translated the wiretaps into Turkish does not mean that they did
not plan to use the English versions in U.S. courts. Moreover, “the
TNP never acted on the information it obtained.”232 The evidence
that the TNP obtained from the wiretaps also would have been
inadmissible in Turkish courts.233 These facts undercut the
Second Circuit’s conclusion that the English-to-Turkish translation indicated a lack of DEA control over the wiretap. To the contrary, it shows that the DEA had access to the wiretaps and used
its resources to collaborate with the TNP. As with the evidence
above, this exemplifies active participation by the DEA and provision of substantial resources.
3. This proposal increases the likelihood of finding a joint
venture, which provides some—but not complete—
constitutional protections.
The international silver platter doctrine demonstrates the
United States’ commitment to international cooperation to combat the drug threat to the United States. When evidence collected
through international cooperation is governed by the international silver platter doctrine, the doctrine eases the admissibility
of evidence obtained from these wiretaps in U.S. courts because
it allows the introduction of evidence from foreign wiretaps that
is not subject to the same level of protection as wiretaps in the
United States. This strengthens the prosecution’s case against
drug traffickers by admitting critical evidence. The stronger the
case against drug traffickers, the greater the protection of the
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U.S. public against the well-documented harms234 associated with
drug trafficking.
The international silver platter doctrine as it currently
stands eases the admissibility of evidence from foreign wiretaps
both when courts find that a joint venture existed and when
courts find that a joint venture did not exist because of the high
joint venture threshold. When courts find that a joint venture existed, relying on foreign law to evaluate reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment means that when U.S. agents act abroad,
even when wiretapping U.S. citizens, they are subject to reduced
legal thresholds to justify invasions of privacy. This has the effect
of providing U.S. citizens with reduced constitutional protection
when they leave U.S. borders. With my proposed balancing test,
defendants are at least offered the protection that wiretaps will
more often have to comply with foreign law in order for evidence
collected from them to be admissible.
Because of the uncertainty of domestic Fourth Amendment
protections for U.S. citizens abroad,235 if an individual chooses to
go abroad, they may choose to be subject to that country’s laws.
Although a U.S. citizen may choose to go abroad and thus be subject to the laws of that country, the international silver platter
doctrine as it currently stands permits wiretap evidence to be
used in U.S. courts even when foreign law enforcement officers
did not comply with their own laws when conducting wiretaps.
The current high threshold for determining what constitutes a
joint venture allows foreign and U.S. law enforcement to work together, obtain evidence from illegally placed wiretaps, and then
use that evidence in U.S. courts without fear of exclusion, even
against U.S. citizens. This high threshold is concerning because
as soon as a court finds that a joint venture did not occur, that
court will not inquire into foreign law at all to determine the admissibility of intercepted communications. This means that
adopting a broader conception of what constitutes a joint venture
would provide defendants with protection against illegal intrusions by foreign-U.S. law enforcement joint ventures and prevent
the use of evidence from these intrusions against them in courts.
My proposal would lead courts to more frequently find that
joint ventures exist, which in turn would increase the opportunities for courts to evaluate joint venture wiretaps under foreign
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law. It prioritizes upholding the integrity of the courts through
protecting the privacy of defendants in narcotics cases and articulating a uniform interpretation of the law, and it does not do so
at the expense of international cooperation. My proposal does not
provide U.S. defendants with the same constitutional protections
they would have against a domestic wiretap, but it still provides
some protection by requiring legality under the laws of the country where the wiretap occurred. A joint venture finding only requires that the wiretap comply with the law of the country where
it occurred to be admissible. This seems like a strikingly low bar
considering that many foreign countries’ laws concerning wiretaps fall below U.S. constitutional standards, but it is a compromise that balances some constitutional protections with public
safety concerns of facilitating successful narcotics prosecutions.
In the wiretap context for narcotics cases, only the Ninth
Circuit has found the existence of a joint venture between U.S.
and foreign law enforcement. Practically, this means that only the
Ninth Circuit requires wiretaps obtained by foreign and U.S. law
enforcement on foreign soil to comply with foreign law. Other circuits admit evidence from these wiretaps without requiring that
these wiretaps actually comply with foreign law. This makes
venue an important factor for whether wiretap evidence will be
admissible in court. Venue should have no role in this process.
The admissibility of wiretap evidence obtained by foreign law enforcement abroad under foreign law should depend solely on uniform factors under the international silver platter doctrine.
Given the considerations noted above, my proposal may improve judicial legitimacy. Courts’ legitimacy depends in part on
whether decisions accord with constitutional legal norms.236 Applying a policy or doctrine like the international silver platter doctrine can impact judicial legitimacy because of how courts treat
the right to privacy of U.S. citizens, who usually enjoy constitutional protections against government searches. Although prosecution for drug-trafficking offenses decreased in 2020,237 the
Biden administration’s renewed attention to prosecuting narcotics offenses indicates a future rise in narcotics prosecutions.238 Because of the international nature of narcotics trafficking, U.S.
236 See Gillian E. Metzger, Considering Legitimacy, 18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 353,
358 (2020).
237 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR
2020, at 5 (2021).
238 See generally White House, supra note 13.
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prosecutors will continue to rely on international sources of evidence. And given that narcotics prosecutions rely heavily on evidence from wiretaps, we can expect more use of wiretaps obtained
abroad. Collectively, this will place the international silver platter doctrine more in the public eye. The more scrutiny it receives,
the more it will become apparent that courts are admitting evidence from foreign wiretaps obtained in contravention of foreign
law. Courts sometimes admit illegally obtained evidence from domestic wiretaps that do not comply with the warrant and probable cause requirements if the good faith exception applies. In this
scenario, prior to admitting illegally obtained evidence, the good
faith exception still provides some protection for defendants—
U.S. law enforcement cannot intentionally avoid the warrant and
probable cause requirements. The international silver platter
doctrine as it is currently used does not provide even that basic
protection if courts do not find that a joint venture existed.
A critique of my proposal is that it may increase the difficulty
of admitting wiretap evidence from joint ventures in cases involving U.S. defendants, which can implicate the government’s ability
to prosecute narcotics cases and ultimately public safety concerns. A lower threshold for finding a joint venture means that
more courts will evaluate whether a wiretap complied with foreign law. This may pose some institutional difficulties for courts
that lack familiarity with other countries’ laws and interpretations of those laws. In these instances, the Ninth Circuit’s
analyses of foreign law provide helpful examples of how U.S.
courts should approach foreign law: with deference to foreign
courts.239 Analyzing foreign law will no doubt require the expenditure of additional judicial resources, but parties will presumably
brief the foreign law issues, therefore potentially alleviating
judicial strain. This sacrifice seems reasonable compared to the
alternative—the carte blanche admission of illegally obtained evidence. In cases where the wiretap did not comply with foreign
law, the evidence gained from the wiretap could still be admissible if the good faith exception applies. If the wiretap neither complied with foreign law nor is eligible for that exception, the
prosecution cannot use the evidence in U.S. courts. Prosecutors
would need evidence from other sources, which may be impossible
or time-consuming to obtain. This may result in a delay of the
case’s prosecution, which taxes judicial time and resources.
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Wiretaps can produce key evidence against narcotics traffickers
because they provide a unique window into private cartel operations.240 Therefore, finding more joint ventures—and accordingly
excluding more wiretap evidence—may make prosecuting narcotics trafficking cases involving joint ventures more difficult.
Consequently, this creates potential public safety concerns.
The harder it becomes to prosecute narcotics violations, the easier
it will be for defendants accused of these crimes to evade punishment and instead return to their narcotics trafficking activities.
Narcotics production and trafficking pose a real danger. My proposal does not seek to minimize that danger but rather to
question the way courts balance that danger against threats to
privacy. The current formulation of joint venture rules treats international cooperation and defendants’ constitutional protections like a zero-sum game in which international cooperation
must always come before even the most basic constitutional protections for defendants. This contradicts the foundations of the
Fourth Amendment, which was drafted to protect people against
unlawful government intrusions into their private lives.
CONCLUSION
The joint venture exception to the international silver platter
doctrine suffers from a lack of standardization. This issue is especially prominent in narcotics cases involving wiretaps, but this
Comment’s reasoning and solution apply broadly to other types of
searches. The lack of a uniform test for what constitutes a joint
venture undervalues heavy U.S. cooperation with foreign countries and makes venue an important factor in whether a court
finds that a joint venture existed. I propose adopting a balancing
test involving the following factors: (1) who initiated or controlled
the wiretap, (2) whether U.S. law enforcement provided substantial resources to foreign law enforcement, and (3) how the U.S.
and foreign law enforcement describe their relationship. The proposal would make finding a joint venture easier and thus reflect
the true level of cooperation between U.S. and foreign law enforcement. Similarly, it would take account of technological
advancements that might otherwise decrease the likelihood of
finding a joint venture under the current doctrine.
Joint venture findings are important because they provide
narcotics defendants with minimal, basic constitutional
240
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protections. Even if courts conclude that a joint venture existed,
while narcotics defendants have some constitutional protections,
the admission of evidence remains an easy feat. Finding a joint
venture only requires that the wiretap complied with the foreign
law where the wiretap occurred, which is a strikingly low bar considering that foreign laws regarding wiretaps often fall below constitutional requirements for domestic wiretaps. However, this low
bar is still better than the status quo, which provides no protection for defendants.
The international silver platter doctrine prioritizes international cooperation to combat global threats like drug trafficking.
My proposal does not diminish this international cooperation—
even if it may make the prosecution of narcotics cases more difficult in certain instances where wiretaps were conducted illegal.
These circumstances balance two competing values: protecting
the public from narcotics threats and protecting defendants
against unauthorized government intrusions on their liberty and
privacy. Since joint venture wiretaps often provide key evidence
in narcotics cases, defendants face the hurdle of arguing their innocence against illegally obtained evidence.
Which side of the balance wins depends on what prosecutors
and judges view as the larger threat: narcotics or the admission
of illegally obtained evidence. This balancing should not pose a
zero-sum game. My proposal recommends reducing the threshold
for what constitutes a joint venture so as to allow admission of
important evidence only if it complied with the baseline legal protections of foreign legal systems. Otherwise, U.S. law enforcement
must reasonably rely on assertions that the wiretap was legal.
This prioritizes upholding the integrity of the courts through protecting the privacy of defendants in narcotics cases but does not
impose an unreasonable task on foreign and U.S. law enforcement. In fact, creating a balancing test that requires wiretaps to
be legal in order for the evidence from those wiretaps to be admissible is exactly how U.S. courts treat domestic wiretaps.

